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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeffery T. Lish appeals from the judgment of conviction for stalking in the first 
degree entered following his jury trial. Mr. Lish asserts that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt in two particulars: (1) because the State 
did not present substantial evidence that Mr. Lish engaged in a prohibited course of 
conduct, and (2) because the State did not present substantial evidence that, assuming 
he engaged in a prohibited course of conduct, any conduct engaged in by Mr. Lish 
caused the alleged victim to be "seriously annoy[ed], alarm[ed] or harass[ed]" or "would 
cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress." 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Lish was charged by information with stalking in the first degree, alleged to 
have been committed as follows: 
That the said JEFFERY TODD LISH, in the County of Bannock, State of 
Idaho, on or between the 2ih day of March 2010 and the 3rd of April, 
2010, did knowingly and maliciously engage in a course of conduct that 
seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed the victim causing substantial 
emotional distress to the victim, LINDA WOODS, and/or having been 
previously convicted of a crime under this section or section 18-7906, 
Idaho Code. 
(R., p.51.) 
The alleged victim, Ms. Woods, testified at trial that she and Mr. Lish began 
dating in September of 2009. (Tr., p.19, Ls.10-12.) They first broke-up in mid-February 
of 2010, before getting back together a couple of days later after he contacted her to 
reconcile. (Tr., p.20, L.25 - p.21, L.16.) They broke-up for the second time in early 
March of 201 O (Tr., p.21, Ls.22-24), before getting back together again a few days later 
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after Mr. Lish contacted her to reconcile. (Tr., p.51, L.20 - p.52, L.7.) They broke-up 
for the third and final time on March 25, 2010. (Tr., p.22, Ls.15-21.) 
On March 27, 2010, Mr. Lish contacted Ms. Woods at their church in an attempt 
to get back together with her. (Tr., p.23, L.23 - p.24, L.23.) On March 28, 2010, he 
sent her a text message telling her that he was on his way over to her house. She sent 
a text message back saying, "Don't come over." He then called her to say the he was 
almost at her house, and he arrived at her front door a few second later. Ms. Woods 
described him as being "pretty mellow[,]" and explained that she did not tell him not to 
have further contact with her because she maintained the hope that they could still be 
friends. (Tr., p.29, L.11 - p.31, L.1.) 
On March 30, 2010, Mr. Lish again went to Ms. Woods' home. They discussed a 
voice mail that Ms. Woods' ex-husband, Kelly Woods, had left for him telling him to stop 
having contact with Ms. Woods. Mr. Lish told Ms. Woods that he took the message to 
be a threat, and had spent the morning filing charges against Mr. Woods. After about 
ten minutes, Mr. Lish left when Ms. Woods told him that she had to go to work. She still 
had not told him not to have contact with her. Ten minutes after she got to work that 
day, her ex-husband arrived to say that Mr. Lish had called him to say that he was filing 
charges against him. It was at that point that she decided to have Mr. Woods go to the 
police on her behalf. Officer Boll then contacted her by telephone to ask what she 
wanted to do. She told Officer Boll to tell Mr. Lish that she no longer wished to have 
contact with him. Officer Boll told her that he would relay that message to Mr. Lish. 
(Tr., p.31, L.19-p.35, LA.) 
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Officer Boll testified that, after learning of Ms. Woods' wishes, he used 
Mr. Woods' cell phone to contact Mr. Lish. 1 He told Mr. Lish that "he could not contact 
her for the purpose of pursuing their relationship[.]" Officer Boll described their 
conversation as follows: 
I talked to him about the complaints of unwanted contact, both via phone 
and text messages and other forms of electronic media, and also not 
coming to the residences of either Kelly or his ex-wife, and also not 
coming to her place of employment at Applebee's. 
Mr. Lish then explained that he and Ms. Woods attended the same church, and asked 
whether he could continue to attend the church. Officer Boll explained that "if he saw 
her specifically [at church], he could not continue to pursue reconciling the relationship." 
(Tr., p.119, L.17 - p.120, L.22.) 
The next contact between Mr. Lish and Ms. Woods occurred at their church on 
April 3, 2010. Ms. Woods testified that she saw Mr. Lish sitting in the back row pointing 
what she believed was a video camera in her direction while she was practicing with the 
church band. That incident lasted approximately the length of one song. After the 
service, she saw him standing near the front door with his cousin, and when she 
tried to go out the door, he took a step forward and asked if he could hold 
my daughter, who was very excited to see him because she's four ... So I 
handed her to him for a second. She gave him a hug, [and I] took her 
back. I didn't say a word to him, and I walked out the door. 
(Tr., p.35, L.22 - p.39, L.21.) 
1 Officer Boll's testimony is inconsistent with Ms. Woods' testimony in one respect: she 
testified that she directed her ex-husband to contact the police only after her March 30, 
2010, encounter with Mr. Lish, and that she spoke to Officer Boll about her desire to 
have no further contact with Mr. Lish that day. (Tr., p.31, L.19 - p.34, L.18, p.64, Ls.2-
4.) Officer Boll testified that he became involved when Mr. Woods arrived at the police 
station on March 29, 2010. (Tr., p.116, Ls.10-16.) Mr. Woods testified that the 
encounter that Ms. Woods' described as occurring on March 30, 2010, occurred on 
March 29, 2010. (Tr., p.90, L.13 - p.93, L.11.) 
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Ms. Woods testified that she had no further contact with Mr. Lish after the 
incident at the church, and that the church incident constituted the only "personal 
contact" that they had after she requested that Officer Boll convey her no contact 
request. (Tr., p.63, L.23 - p.64, L.1.) A manager at Applebee's, where Ms. Woods 
worked, testified that sometime "in early April" of 2010, Mr. Lish entered Applebee's, 
asked if Ms. Woods was working, was told no, and left. (Tr., p.109, Ls.10-23.) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Lish guilty of stalking.2 
(Tr., p.236, Ls.4-23.) Mr. Lish then waived his right to a trial on the issue of his prior 
conviction, and acknowledged that he had previously been convicted of stalking, making 
the current charge stalking in the first degree. (Tr., p.239, L.18 - p.240, L.10.) 
At sentencing, defense counsel asked that Mr. Lish be placed on probation, 
without requesting a specific underlying sentence. (Tr., p.248, Ls.10-13.) The State 
requested that the district court impose a unified sentence of four years, with one and 
one-half years fixed, while retaining jurisdiction. (Tr., p.252, Ls.1-4.) Ultimately, the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half years 
fixed, and retained jurisdiction for one year, with a recommendation that Mr. Lish be 
sent on a traditional rider. (Tr., p.255, Ls.12-17.) 
Several months into Mr. Lish's rider, the district court received a recommendation 
that it relinquish jurisdiction. Following a hearing, the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction, without modifying Mr. Lish's underlying sentence. (R., pp.177-78.) Mr. Lish 
filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.3 (R., p.186.) 
2 The jury had not been informed of Mr. Lish's prior conviction, which made this incident 
a felony, for purposes of reaching its initial verdict. 
3 Before filing his Notice of Appeal, defense counsel filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting leniency but providing no new information. 
(R., pp.182-83.) The district court denied the motion. (R., p.184.) Because no new 
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ISSUE 
Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt? 
information was provided in support of the Rule 35 motion, Mr. Lish does not raise the 
denial of his Rule 35 motion as an issue on appeal. See State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 
201, 203 (2007) (denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be reviewed on appeal when no 
new information was presented in support of the motion). 
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ARGUMENT 
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support The Jury's Finding Of Guilt 
A. Introduction 
Under Idaho Code § 18-7906, a person commits stalking when that person 
engages in a course of conduct that "seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the victim 
and is such as would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress." 
Mr. Lish asserts that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish his guilt in two 
particulars: (1) it did not establish that Mr. Lish engaged in a prohibited course of 
conduct because the evidence did not establish at least two violations of a request for 
no contact, and (2) it did not establish that the alleged victim, Ms. Woods, was seriously 
annoyed, alarmed, or harassed, or that a reasonable person in her position would have 
suffered "substantial emotional distress." 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review for an appellate court when considering the sufficiency of 
the evidence to sustain a conviction was set forth in State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 823 
(Ct. App. 1992), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals explained that: 
A conviction will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence upon 
which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, we construe all facts, 
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, in favor of upholding the 
jury's verdict. Where there is competent although conflicting evidence to 
sustain the verdict, we will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the verdict. 
Id. (citations omitted). "For evidence to be substantial, it must be of sufficient quality 
that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 
808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586 
(1996)). 
6 
C. The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support The Jury's Finding Of Guilt 
Idaho Code § 18-7906 sets forth the crime of stalking in the second degree as 
follows: 
(1) A person commits the crime of stalking in the second degree if the 
person knowingly and maliciously: 
(a) Engages in a course of conduct that seriously alarms, annoys or 
harasses the victim and is such as would cause a reasonable person 
substantial emotional distress; or 
(b) Engages in a course of conduct such as would cause a reasonable 
person to be in fear of death or physical injury, or in fear of the death or 
physical injury of a family or household member. 
I.C. § 18-7906(1) (emphases added). Mr. Lish was charged with stalking under 
subsection (a) of the stalking in the second degree statute, which was elevated to felony 
stalking in the first degree under I.C. § 18-7905 because of a previous conviction for 
stalking in the second degree. (R., pp.51-52.) 
The statute defines "course of conduct" as follows: 
"Course of conduct" means repeated acts of nonconsensual contact 
involving the victim or a family or household member of the victim, 
provided however, that constitutionally protected activity is not included 
within the meaning of this definition. 
I.C. § 18-7906(2)(a). Under the statute, then, a course of conduct must involve more 
than one instance of nonconsensual contact. Id.; see also State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 
383, 391 (2010) (course of conduct must consist of more than one act). 
The statute defines "nonconsensual conduct" as follows: 
"Nonconsensual contact" means any contact with the victim that is initiated 
or continued without the victim's consent, that is beyond the scope of the 
consent provided by the victim, or that is in disregard of the victim's 
expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued. 
"Nonconsensual contact" includes, but is not limited to: 
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(i) Following the victim or maintaining surveillance, including by electronic 
means, on the victim; 
(ii) Contacting the victim in a public place or on private property; 
(iii) Appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; 
(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased or occupied by 
the victim; 
(v) Contacting the victim by telephone or causing the victim's telephone to 
ring repeatedly or continuously regardless of whether a conversation 
ensues; 
(vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to the victim; or 
(vii) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, 
leased or occupied by the victim. 
I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c) (emphasis added). 
1. The Evidence Was Insufficient To Establish A Course Of Conduct 
It is necessary to examine the several contacts that occurred between March 27, 
2010, and April 3, 2010, to determine which, if any, can form the basis for a course of 
conduct under the stalking statute. Prior to Officer Boll relaying Ms. Woods' wishes 
concerning contact after the March 29 (or March 30) incident at her home, Ms. Woods 
had not told Mr. Lish not to contact her. (Tr., p.29, L.11 - p.31, L.1.) Therefore, any 
incident occurring prior to Officer Boll's contact of Mr. Lish cannot form the basis for the 
course of conduct required to establish the crime of stalking. Only two incidents 
occurred after Officer Boll contacted Mr. Lish: when he went to Applebee's in early April 
while Ms. Woods was not there (Tr., p.109, Ls.10-23), and the incident that occurred at 
their church on April 3, 2010. (Tr., p.35, L.22- p.39, L.21.) 
In its closing argument, the State argued that Ms. Woods "didn't give him any 
consent. She said, 'I do not want any contact with you whatsoever."' (Supp.Tr., p.27, 
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L.24 - p.28, L.1.) Based on the evidence, the State must have been referring to the 
message relayed by Officer Boll to Mr. Lish because Ms. Woods never testified that she 
personally told Mr. Lish to stop contacting her. An examination of that message reveals 
that Mr. Lish was told not to visit Ms. Woods' home or place of employment 
(Applebee's), that he could attend the same church, but that "if he saw her specifically 
[at church], he could not continue to pursue reconciling the relationship." (Tr., p.120, 
Ls.19-22 (emphasis added).) 
Leaving aside the question of whether a person can express, through a third 
party, a desire that contact be discontinued, it is clear that the definition of 
nonconsensual contact applicable to the facts of this case includes only contact that 
occurs in excess of the scope of what the victim has expressed.4 In this case, that 
scope is defined by what Officer Boll told Mr. Lish were Ms. Woods' wishes. 
With respect to Mr. Lish's visit to Applebee's, that was clearly in violation of the 
scope of the no contact message relayed by Officer Boll. As such, assuming that the 
behavior was malicious on the part of Mr. Lish, it can represent one of the minimum of 
two contacts necessary under the statute. 
With respect to contact at their church, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Lish 
was not told that he could not have any contact with Ms. Woods at their church; he was 
instead told that any contact could not include an attempt "to pursue reconciling the 
relationship." (Tr., p.120, Ls.19-22.) The evidence is undisputed that Mr. Lish was not 
4 Mr. Lish maintains that, concerning the nature of their past relationship and the fact 
that Ms. Woods did not indicate an unwillingness to consent to contact with Mr. Lish 
until she did so through Officer Boll on or about March 30, 2010, the portion of the 
definition of course of conduct providing for contact that is "initiated or continued without 
the victim's consent" is not applicable to the facts of this case. Should the State argue 
otherwise in its Respondent's Brief, Mr. Lish will offer a response through his Reply 
Brief. 
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told that he could not film the victim while at the church; 5 he was only told that any 
contact that occurred at the church could not involve an attempt to reconcile their 
relationship. 
The evidence is undisputed that the only communicative contact that Mr. Lish 
had with Ms. Woods on April 3, 2010, occurred after the church service and did not 
include any discussion or attempt to discuss reconciling with Ms. Woods. The contact 
was described by Ms. Woods as occurring when Mr. Lish, who was standing by the 
door of the church with his cousin, saw her approaching with her daughter, and 
took a step forward and asked if he could hold my daughter, who was very 
excited to see him because she's four ... So I handed her to him for a 
second. She gave him a hug, [and I] took her back. I didn't say a word to 
him, and I walked out the door. 
(Tr., p.35, L.22 - p.39, L.21.) No evidence was presented that this limited 
communication involved an attempt by Mr. Lish to discuss their relationship, let alone 
attempt to reconcile it. Any such contact, then, could not have been done "knowingly" 
as required under the statute. As such, the contact at the church, including the 
purported video camera incident, cannot serve as a second underlying incident in a 
course of conduct for purposes of a stalking conviction. 6 
Because the State only demonstrated one incident (the Applebee's incident) that 
could be considered to be a violation of Ms. Woods' expressed desire regarding 
5 Obviously, if a person is told not to have any contact with a victim, then the examples 
set forth in subsection (2)(c), including the prohibition on conducting surveillance of a 
victim, would apply without limitation (except with respect to constitutionally-protected 
activities). However, in Mr. Lish's case, he was only told that any church contact could 
not involve an attempt to reconcile the relationship with Ms. Woods. 
6 This, of course, leaves aside the issue of whether any such conduct was done 
maliciously, which was a question that the clearly jury grappled with. (See R., pp.140-
42 (the jury had two questions during deliberations: one asked for clarification of the 
term "maliciously" while the other asked what to do if the jury could not reach a 
unanimous verdict).) 
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contact, there was no evidence that Mr. Lish engaged in a prohibited course of conduct, 
let alone substantial evidence to support a jury finding on that element of the stalking 
statute. As such, this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this 
matter to the district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal on the charge of stalking in 
the first degree. 
2. The Evidence Was Insufficient To Establish That Ms. Woods Was "Seriously 
Annoy[edl, Alarm[ed] Or Harass[edl" Or That A Reasonable Person Would Suffer 
"Substantial Emotional Distress" As A Result Of Mr. Lish's Behavior 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Lish's behavior constituted a course of 
conduct (which he disputes in the preceding subsection), that behavior is not such that it 
caused Ms. Woods to be "seriously annoy[ed], alarm[ed] or harass[ed]" or that it would 
have caused a reasonable person "substantial emotional distress." Under the plain 
language of the statute, a victim must be both "seriously annoy[ed], alarm[ed] or 
harass[ed]" as a result of a defendant's course of conduct (a subjective standard), and 
that course of conduct must also be of such a character that it would cause "a 
reasonable person substantial emotional distress" (an objective standard).7 I.C. § 18-
7906(1)(a). 
a. The Subjective Standard 
At trial, Ms. Woods testified about her feelings concerning only one of the two 
incidents that occurred after she asked Officer Boll to relay her feelings concerning 
7 This limitation is important because it prevents criminalizing conduct that only offends 
a person who is overly sensitive to annoying but otherwise innocent behavior, such as 
multiple telephone calls from a bill collector or a door-to-door salesman who repeatedly 
ignores a "No Soliciting" sign (both of which would be criminal given an overly sensitive 
victim and the lack of an objective standard). 
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future contact with Mr. Lish. 8 As for the April 3, 2010, church incident she explained 
that she was "really annoyed and angry" because Mr. Lish appeared at their church 
earlier than usual. She explained that she felt annoyed because "he doesn't ever come 
that early [and] I didn't want to see him anymore. And he knew that. And it just made 
me extremely uncomfortable." 
With respect to the incident near the door, she explained that she "was really 
annoyed" and "angry" because she "didn't want any contact with him[,]" "didn't want to 
see him[,]" and "didn't want to talk to him."9 (Tr., p.37, L.4 - p.40, L.2.) However, 
because none of Mr. Lish's behavior during the April 3, 2010, church incident violated 
the expressed consent and wishes of Ms. Woods (as relayed by Officer Boll), they could 
not have provided the basis for a finding that his behavior subjectively caused her 
serious annoyance, alarm, or harassment. 
However, it was only after she "was presented with a public record on him" 
following the April 3, 2010, church incident that she "decided to go to the police and 
press charges because it was just going to get worse." (Tr., p.40, Ls.3-7.) Mr. Lish 
never contacted Ms. Woods in any way after the April 3, 2010, church incident, and, 
therefore, his course of conduct could not have been responsible for any feelings of 
serious annoyance, alarm, or harassment that she may have felt as a result of 
information learned only after any course of conduct ended. 
8 She did not testify as to her feelings about the Applebee's incident. (Tr., p.35, Ls.5-
17.) 
9 Unfortunately for (and unknown to) Ms. Woods, Officer Boll gave Mr. Lish express 
permission to be seen by her at their church, and to have any contact with her at their 
church that did not amount to an attempt to reconcile their relationship. (Tr., p.120, 
Ls.19-22.) 
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The State failed to present substantial evidence that Mr. Lish engaged in a 
course of conduct that caused Ms. Woods to feel seriously annoyed, alarmed, or 
harassed. As such, the judgment of conviction should be vacated, and this case should 
be remanded to the district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal on the charge of 
stalking in the first degree. 
b. The Objective Standard 
The question that must be answered with respect to the objective standard is 
whether the course of conduct (the Applebee's incident and the April 3, 2010, church 
incident) purportedly engaged in by Mr. Lish would have caused a reasonable person 
substantial emotional distress. 
Mr. Lish does not dispute that a reasonable person might have been alarmed by 
the post-warning Applebee's visit. That only leaves the church incident for 
consideration. Mr. Lish asserts that the church incident, during which Mr. Lish attended 
a service at his own church the day before Easter and did not violate any of the 
expressed limitations on contact with Ms. Woods at their church, would not have caused 
a reasonable person to have felt substantial emotional distress. 
While the standard to be applied is an objective one, it is worth noting that 
Ms. Woods only "decided to go to the police and press charges" after the church 
incident because she "was presented with a public record on him"10 and decided that "it 
was just going to get worse." (Tr., p.40, Ls.3-7.) Mr. Lish never contacted, or attempted 
to contact, Ms. Woods in any way after the April 3, 2010, church incident, and, 
10 This is a reference to Mr. Lish's prior conviction for misdemeanor stalking. (Tr., p.68, 
Ls.11-24.) The district court had entered an order the morning of trial prohibiting any 
reference to Mr. Lish's prior conviction for stalking during the trial. (Tr., p.69, L.16 -
p.70, L.2.) 
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therefore, anything that occurred after the church incident could not be said to have 
been the result of any course of conduct engaged in by him. Therefore, even if a 
reasonable person in Ms. Woods' situation would have felt substantial emotional 
distress after learning of the prior conviction, that would not be relevant to a 
determination as to whether Mr. Lish's course of conduct caused such substantial 
emotional distress. To hold otherwise would violate the plain language of the statute, 
which requires that the course of conduct "[e]ngage[d] in" by the defendant be what 
"would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress." I.C. § 18-7906(1) 
(a). 
The State failed to present substantial evidence that assuming, arguendo, 
Mr. Lish engaged in a prohibited course of conduct, that any such conduct was such 
that it would have caused a reasonable person substantial emotional distress. As such, 
the judgment of conviction should be vacated, and this case should be remanded to the 
district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal on the charge of stalking in the first 
degree. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Lish respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for entry 
of a judgment of acquittal on the charge of stalking in the first degree. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 2012. 
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